UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

4-26-2018

Gomez v. Crookham Company Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45542

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs

Recommended Citation
"Gomez v. Crookham Company Respondent's Brief Dckt. 45542" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court Records &
Briefs, All. 7599.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7599

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

BALTAZAR GOMEZ, JR.; ESTELLA
GRIMALDO; ELENA GOMEZ;
ELIZABETH FREEMAN; VERONICA
FERRO; ZANDRA PEDROZA; ALICIA
GOMEZ; YESENIA GOMEZ; AND
BALTAZAR GOMEZ, III,

Supreme Court Docket No. 45542-2017
Canyon County Case No. CV16-6656

Appellants,
vs.
CROOKHAM COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation; and JOHN DOES I-IV OR
JON DOE CORPORATION I-IV,
Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the State of Idaho,
in and for the County of Canyon, Honorable Thomas J. Ryan, District Judge, Presiding

Kevin E. Dinius, ISB #5974
Sarah Hallock-Jayne, ISB #5745
Dinius & Associates, PLLC
5680 E. Franklin Road, Suite 130
Nampa, ID 83687

James A. Ford, ISB #3410
Joseph F. Southers, ISB #9568
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701

Nathan T. Gamel, ISB #8213
SKAUG LAW, P.C.
1266 E. Karcher Road
Nampa, ID 83687

Attorneys for Respondent Crookham Company

Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................................................................................... 1
A.

Nature of the Case ................................................................................................... 1

B.

Statement of Facts .................................................................................................... 2

C.

Course of Proceedings ............................................................................................. 5

II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL. ................................................................................... 8

III.

STAND ARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................. 9

IV.

ARGUMENT ....................................................................................................................... 9
A.

The Idaho Industrial Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction over
Appellants' Wrongful Death Claim......................................................................... 9

B.

The Idaho Industrial Commission Has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Claims
for Injuries, Including Fatal Injuries, Arising Out of and In the Course of
Employment. .......................................................................................................... 17

C.

Idaho Code§ 72-209(1) Provides the Exclusive Remedy Rule ............................ 19

D.

The Holdings in Corgatelli, Davis, and Wernecke are Distinguishable
from the Issues and Facts of this Case ................................................................... 23

E.

The District Court Correctly Determined that Ms. Gomez Sustained Fatal
Injuries Caused by an Accident Arising Out of and In the Course of her
Employment. .......................................................................................................... 25

F.

The District Court Did Analyze the Consciously Disregarded Knowledge
Prong and Correctly Determined that Appellants Failed to Satisfy Their
Burden to Prove That the Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Rule
Applies ................................................................................................................... 27

G.

Under the Facts of this Case, Crookham is Not a Manufacturer as Defined
by the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act. .......................................................... 33

H.

Appellants' Request for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal
And Request to Overturn the District Court's Award of Costs to
Crookham Should Be Denied .........·....................................................................... 35
i

V.

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 36

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ...................................................................................................... 36

11

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases
Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813,819,555 P.2d 144, 150 (1976) ......................................... 12, 27
Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co., 161 Idaho 205,208, 384 P.3d 969,972 (2016) 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
Bedard & Musser v. City of Boise City, 162 Idaho 688,689,403 P.3d 632,633 (2017) ................ 9
Capps v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 149 Idaho 737,745,240 P.3d 583,591 (2010) ........................ .35
Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014) ................................ 23, 24, 25
Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., Inc., 161 Idaho 791,391 P.3d 1261 (2017), reh'g denied (Mar.
30, 2017), reh'g denied (Apr. 13, 2017) ........................................................................ 23, 24, 25
DeMoss v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 179, 795 P.2d 875,878 (1990)28, 29, 30, 31, 32
Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7, 11, 121 P.3d 938, 942
(2005) ......................................................................................................................................... 27
Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330,334, 193 P.2d 831,833 (1948) .................................... 11, 13
Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 715 P.2d 978 (1986) ............................................................. 18
Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606,609,349 P.3d 1197, 1200 (2015) ............... 9
Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902,909,980 P.2d 566,573 (1999) ............... 10, 11
In re Haynes, 95 Idaho 492,496,511 P.2d 309,313 (1973) ......................................................... 15
Int'/ Harvester Co. v. TRW, Inc., 107 Idaho 1123, 695 P.2d 1262 (1985) .................................... 33
Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755,757,760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1988) ................. 27, 28, 29, 31, 32
KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2004) ...................... 26
Krinitt v. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425,398 P.3d 158 (2017) .............................. 14
Liberty Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho
679,685,365 P.3d 1033, 1039 (2016) ........................................................................................ 9

iii

Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211,384 P.3d 975 (2016) ...................... 14, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32
Mayer v. TPC Holdings, 160 Idaho 223,370 P.3d 738 (2016) ..................................................... 24
Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,260,954 P.2d 676,678 (1998) ...................... 17, 18, 25
Miller v. Idaho State Patrol, 150 Idaho 856,863, 252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) ............................. 9
Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141 Idaho 524,530, 112 P.3d 812,818 (2005) ........................... 10, 11, 12
Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prod., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d 324 (1984) ................. 20, 21, 22
Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 112 Idaho 277,278, 731 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1986) ..................... 33
Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763,766,450 P.2d 610,613 (1969) .............. 11, 12, 13, 18
Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P .2d 717 (1994) ..................................... 18
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 (2009) .23, 24, 25
Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 659 P.2d 87 (1983) ................................... 29
Statutes
Idaho Code§ 12-120 ..................................................................................................................... 35
Idaho Code§ 12-121 ..................................................................................................................... 35
Idaho Code § 5-311 ....................................................................................................................... 13
Idaho Code§ 6-1402 ............................................................................................................... 33, 34
Idaho Code§ 6-1402(3) ................................................................................................................. 34
Idaho Code§ 72-101(9) ........................................................................................................... 15, 26
Idaho Code § 72-102 ..................................................................................................................... 13
Idaho Code§ 72-102(10) ......................................................................................................... 21, 22
Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(a) .......................................................................................................... 20
Idaho Code§ 72-102(13)(b) .......................................................................................................... 20

iv

Idaho Code § 72-102( 16) ............................................................................................................... 16
Idaho Code§ 72-102(18)(a) .......................................................................................................... 26
Idaho Code§ 72-102(18)(b) .......................................................................................................... 26
Idaho Code§ 72-102(18)(c) .......................................................................................................... 26
Idaho Code§ 72-102(9) ................................................................................................................. 10
Idaho Code§ 72-201 ............................................................... 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 27, 28
Idaho Code§ 72-203 ..................................................................................................................... 14
Idaho Code§ 72-209 ............................................................... 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 27
Idaho Code§ 72-209(1) ........................................................................................ .19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Idaho Code§ 72-209(3) ........................................................................................... 7, 19, 20, 28, 29
Idaho Code§ 72-211 ....................................... 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27
Idaho Code § 72-216( 1) ................................................................................................................ 22
Idaho Code§ 72-223 ....................................................................................... 11, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23
Idaho Code § 72-301 ..................................................................................................................... 12
Idaho Code§ 72-302 ................................................................................................................,..... 13
Idaho Code§ 72-318 ..................................................................................................................... 24
Idaho Code§ 72-410 ..................................................................................................................... 15
Idaho Code § 72-411 ..................................................................................................................... 16
Idaho Code§ 72-412 ..................................................................................................................... 16
Idaho Code§ 72-413 ......................................................................................................... 15, 16, 18
Idaho Code§ 72-413A ................................................................................................................... 16
Idaho Code§ 72-415 ..................................................................................................................... 16

V

Idaho Code § 72-416 ..................................................................................................................... 16
Idaho Code § 72-420 ..................................................................................................................... 18
Idaho Code § 72-707 ..................................................................................................................... 10

Rules
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 ................................................................................................................ 35
Idaho Rule of Ci vii Procedure l 2(b )( 1) ......................................................................................... 18
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ......................................................................................... 18
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) ............................................................................................. 35
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( e) .............................................................................................. 35
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) ................................................................................................ 9

VI

I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case

This case arises out of a work-related accident that occurred at defendant-respondent
Crookham Company's ("Crookham") facility in Caldwell, Idaho, and involved one of its
employees, Francisca Gomez. The accident also involved a seed sorting table ("picking table")
that was designed and manufactured by Crookham for its sole use at its facility. Unfortunately,
Ms. Gomez did not survive the injuries that she sustained in the accident. Ms. Gomez's heirs
(collectively "Appellants"), brought this suit against Crookham and co-defendant USC, LLC
("USC") seeking money damages arising from Ms. Gomez's death. Appellants' complaint sets
forth nine causes of action against Crookham and USC, all of which relate to the underlying
accident that involved Ms. Gomez and the picking table.
Crookham's position is that (1) Appellants' exclusive remedy is worker's compensation
benefits because the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Ms. Gomez's fatal injuries arose
out of and in the course of her employment with Crookham; (2) the unprovoked physical
aggression exception to the exclusive remedy rule does not apply in this case; and (3) under the
facts of this case, Crookham is not a "manufacturer" or a "product seller" as those terms defined
by the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act. As such, Appellants' civil claims are precluded by
the exclusive remedy rule of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Act. The District Court properly
granted Crookham's Motion for Summary Judgment and properly dismissed Appellants'
complaint with prejudice.
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B.

Statement of Facts

The factual background section in Appellants' Brief contains statements and/or
characterizations, which are not facts that this Court should consider in deciding this case.
Therefore, Crookham provides the Court with the following statement of facts, which is
consistent with the statement of facts set forth in the District Court's Memorandum Decision on
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Clerk's Record ("R."), pp. 721-722; see generally,

Appellants' Brief ("Appellants' Br."), pp. 1-48.) Moreover, Appellants cite to and rely upon
evidence that was subject to the District Court's Memorandum Decision Upon Defendants'
Motion to Strike. (R. pp. 731-739.) Appellants are not appealing any aspect of the District

Court's decision regarding Crookham's Motion to Strike, which struck portions of Olga Olvera's
affidavit and the Industrial Hygiene Report. (R. pp. 742-746; R. pp. 731-739.) Accordingly,
Appellants' citations and reliance upon the Industrial Hygiene Reports and portions of Olga
Olvera's Affidavit should not be considered on appeal as they were struck by the District Court.
Crookham is a family owned company that has been in business since 1911. Crookham is
a wholesale seed distributor with its principal place of business in Caldwell, Idaho. (R. p. 87,

CJ[

2.) On January 20, 2016, the day of the underlying accident, Francisca Gomez was an employee
of Crookham and had worked for Crookham for more than 30 years. (Id., CJ[ 3; R. p. 12, CJ[ 5.)
On the day of the accident, Ms. Gomez was working in Crookham's Scancore room. (R.
p. 87.) The Scancore room is where employees analyze non-GMO seeds for quality control
purposes. (Id.) The employees pick the seeds that have imperfections off the picking table as the
seeds move along a small conveyer belt. (Id.) At the time of the accident, Ms. Gomez, in the
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course and scope of her employment with Crookham, was cleaning a picking table when her hair
was caught on the table's drive shaft, which pulled Ms. Gomez into the picking table. (R. p. 12,
<j[<J[

5-6.) Ms. Gomez was unable to free herself from the picking table and died as a result of her

injuries. (Id.; R. p. 42,

<JI

4.) Crookham's employees tried to free Ms. Gomez from the picking

table by using their hands to bend metal safety guards in half to try and release Ms. Gomez. (R.
p. 99, Response to Request for Admission No. 9.)
At the time of the accident, the drive shafts on the picking table were covered by a metal
guard. (R. p. 97, Answer to Interrogatory No. 19.) Because no one in the Scancore room
witnessed the circumstances leading up to the accident, Crookham is unaware as to how the
metal guard was avoided and Ms. Gomez got caught in the picking table. (Id.)
As a result of the underlying accident, Plaintiff-Respondent Baltazar Gomez, Jr. (spouse)
and Plaintiff-Respondent Baltazar Gomez, III (dependent son) received worker's compensation
death benefits. (R. pp. 98 and 103.)
The picking table involved in the accident was designed and built by Crookham
employees for Crookham's own use. (R. pp. 87-88.) Crookham fabricated the picking table in
such a manner to avoid foreseeable injuries to its employees. (R. p. 87.) Crookham and its
employees also used their best efforts to train and supervise employees while working in the
Scancore room to avoid foreseeable injuries. (Id.; R. pp. 98-99.)
The picking tables are cleaned by an employee(s) before a different type of seed is to be
analyzed on the tables. (R. p. 554, Deposition of Nelda Cardona ("Cardona Depo.") p. 92, 11. 2024; R. p. 555, Cardona Depo. pp. 95-96, 11. 15-24; R. p. 586, Cardona Depo. p. 221, 11. 3-12.) The
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employee(s) use wands that blow compressed air ("air wands") to clean the picking tables and to
remove any seeds that may have fallen off the picking table. (Id.)
The picking table involved in the accident was a new version of Crookham's old picking
tables. (R. p. 87,

<J[

6.) The old picking tables were also designed and built by Crookham

employees and had been in use for more than 40 years. (Id.) The purpose and intent of the
picking table involved in the accident was to make the seed picking process more efficient as
employees are now analyzing and picking seeds as they travel directly toward an employee. (Id.)
Crookham introduced the concept of the picking table involved in the accident in early
2015, at which time George Crookham requested Jim Bennett, Fabricator and Mechanic at
Crookham, to research whether a picking table, or similar type of machine, was available for
purchase. (R. pp. 663-664, Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Crookham's Designee, Jim Bennett
("Bennett Depo."), pp. 161-162, 11. 25-11.)
Greg Haylett, Crookham's electrician, was Crookham's Rule 30(b)(6) designee regarding
the design and installation of the electrical system that provided power to the picking table. (R.
pp. 691-710.)
Mr. Bennett determined from his research that picking tables, or a similar type of
machine, did not exist. As such, in the spring of 2015, Mr. Bennett was tasked with designing
and fabricating a new picking table where seeds would travel directly towards an employee who
was sitting at the end of a small conveyer belt. (R. p. 631, Bennett Depo. p. 33, 11. 1-20; R. p.
663-664, Bennett Depo. pp. 161-162, 11. 25-11; R. p. 115.) His design consisted of two drawings
and a "full mock-up." (R. pp. 641-642, Bennett Depo. pp. 73-74, 11. 20-3.) Prior to installing the
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picking table in the Scancore room, Mr. Bennett tested and cleaned the picking table in
Crookham's shop. (R. p. 643, Bennett Depo., pp. 80-81, 11. 15-18.)
From the time the picking table was installed in the Scancore room in September or
October of 2015, until January 20, 2016, no accidents or injuries occurred involving the picking
table at issue in this case. (R. pp. 550-551, Cardona Depo. pp. 77-78, 11. 15-1.) After the accident,
OSHA performed and investigation and issued a report with citations and penalties. (R. pp. 333334.)
Crookham did not intend for the new picking table to harm Ms. Gomez, or any other
Crookham employee. (R. pp. 88 and 91.)

C.

Course of Proceedings

Because Appellants' Brief did not include a "Course of Proceedings" section, Crookham
provides the following procedural history of this case.
On July 15, 2016, Appellants filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial
("Complaint"), which named both Crookham Company and USC as defendants. (R. pp. 11-39.)
The Complaint set forth nine causes of action against Crookham and USC: (1) Negligent Design,
Manufacture, Installation, and/or Maintenance; (2) Failure to Warn; (3) Strict LiabilityDefective Product; (4) Strict Liability-Failure to Warn; (5) Breach of Implied Warranty of
Fitness and/or Merchantability; (6) Breach of Express Warranty; (7) Strict LiabilityAbnormally Dangerous Activity; (8) Negligence/Negligence Per Se; and (9) Wrongful Death.
(Id.) Appellants' Complaint incorrectly claimed that the machine involved in the accident was a
LPX 2000 seed treater machine, which is a machine manufactured by co-defendant USC. (See
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generally, R. pp. 11-39 and pp. 51-61.) After Appellants were informed that their Complaint

identified the incorrect machine, the LPX 2000, the parties stipulated to dismiss USC from this
case with prejudice. (R. p. 4.) On November 25, 2016, the District Court entered an order in
which USC was dismissed from this case with prejudice. (Id.) Even though the Complaint
identified the wrong machine that was involved in the accident at issue, Appellants never
amended their Complaint to correct this mistake. (See generally R. pp. 3-9.)
On June 30, 2017, Crookham filed its Motion for Summary Judgment along with its
supporting memorandum and affidavits. (R. pp. 62-115.) In its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Crookham argued that Appellants' Complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because
Appellants' claims are precluded by the exclusive remedy rule of the Idaho's Worker's
Compensation Act. (R. pp. 62-83.) Crookham also argued that all of Appellants' claims should
be dismissed because they are based on products liability legal theories, but Crookham is neither
a manufacturer, nor a seller of the picking table as defined by Idaho's Product Liability Act. (Id.)
On August 2, 2017, Appellants filed their Response to Crookham' s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Affidavit of Nathan T. Gamel in Support of Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, which attached multiple exhibits. (R. pp. 473-515 and pp. 618621.) Appellants argued in their response that Crookham's motion for summary judgment should
be denied because the exclusive remedy rule does not apply to wrongful death cases. (R. pp. 473515.) Appellants also argued that the exclusive remedy rule did not apply in this case as the
incident did not occur in the scope of an employer/employee relationship. (Id.) Appellants
further claimed that if the exclusive remedy rule does apply in this case, they satisfied their
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burden and proved circumstances that gave rise to the application of the exception to the
exclusive remedy rule. (/d.) This exception is set forth in Idaho Code § 72-209(3), which
provides that the exclusive remedy rule "shall not apply in any case where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer." Lastly,
as to their products liability claims, Appellants claimed that Crookham's motion should be
denied because it is a "manufacturer" under the facts of this case because the picking table is a
component part of the seed product that Crookham produces. (Id.)
On August 10, 2017, Crookham filed its reply in support of its motion for summary
judgment. (Clerk's Supplemental Record ("R. Supp.") pp. 6-23.) In its reply, Crookham claimed
that its motion for summary judgment should be granted for the following reasons: (1)
Appellants did not satisfy their burden to establish the unprovoked physical aggression exception
to the exclusive remedy rule; (2) Appellants' Complaint was therefore barred by the exclusive
remedy rule; and (3) Appellants' products liability claims failed as a matter of law because there
was no evidence that would support a finding that Crookham is a manufacturer of the picking
table as defined by Idaho statute. (Id.) At summary judgment, Appellants conceded that there
was no evidence to support the willful physical aggression exception to the exclusive remedy
rule. (R. p. 501.) As such, Appellants only pursued the unprovoked physical aggression
exception to the exclusive remedy rule.
Crookham also filed its Motion to Strike Certain Exhibits to the Affidavit of Nathan T.
Gamel ("Gamel Affidavit") and Portions of the Affidavit of Olga Olvera and memorandum in
support of the same on August 10, 2017. (R. pp. 711-719.) The basis for the motion to strike was
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that certain exhibits attached to Gamel' s Affidavit lacked adequate foundation and were
therefore inadmissible. (R. p. 715.) The basis for Crookham's Motion to Strike regarding Olga
Olvera's Affidavit was based on the fact that certain paragraphs within her affidavit contained
inadmissible hearsay. (R. pp. 713-719.) On September 22, 2017, the District Court granted
Crookham's motion to strike as to the Industrial Hygiene Reports that were created after Ms.
Gomez's death and paragraphs four, five, nine, and fourteen of Olga Olvera's Affidavit. (R. pp.
731-739.) Appellants are not contesting any aspect of the District Court's decision regarding
Crookham's motion to strike. (See generally, Appellants' Brief, pp. 1-48; R. pp. 731-739 and
742-746-Notice of Appeal.)
Also on September 22, 2017, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision Upon
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. pp. 720-730.) The District Court granted
Crookham's motion for summary judgment and properly dismissed Appellants' complaint with
prejudice. (Id.) On October 3, 2017, a Judgment was entered and dismissed all claims set forth in
Appellants' Complaint with prejudice. (R. pp. 740-741.)
On December 29, 2017, the District Court entered an order awarding costs as a matter of
right to Crookham. (R. pp. 747-748.) Appellants timely appealed.
II.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

In addition to the issues on appeal identified in Appellants' Brief, Crookham adds the
following issue on appeal as one of Appellants' issues on appeal was not raised below:
1. Whether this Court Can Consider Appellants' Argument that the District
Court Committed Error in determining that Ms. Gomez's death arose from an
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accident as defined by the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act as it Was Not
Raised Below.

III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is "the
same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment."
Holdaway v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 609, 349 P.3d 1197, 1200 (2015) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party is entitled to
summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bedard & Musser v. City of Boise
City, 162 Idaho 688,689,403 P.3d 632, 633 (2017). "When considering whether the evidence in

the record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally
construe the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Liberty
Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, P.S., 159 Idaho 679, 685, 365

P.3d 1033, 1039 (2016). Therefore, "[i]f there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a
question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Miller v. Idaho State
Patrol, 150 Idaho 856, 863, 252 P.3d 1274, 1281 (2011) (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Idaho Industrial Commission has Exclusive Jurisdiction over
Appellants' Wrongful Death Claim.

Appellants argue on appeal that the District Court committed reversible error when it
determined that the "Idaho Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over industrial death
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claims pursuant to LC. § 72-201." (Appellants' Br., p. 23.) Appellants claim that the Industrial
Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction over "industrial death claims" because Idaho
Code § 72-201 only references personal injuries and occupational diseases but is "silent on
industrially-related death claims." (Id., at p. 24.) This argument is misguided because it ignores
long-established Idaho case authority interpreting Idaho Code § 72-201, including its progeny,
and the Worker's Compensation Act as a whole, which not only defines "death" as "death
resulting from an injury or occupational disease," (Idaho Code § 72-102(9)) but also contains
numerous statutes applicable to claims arising from workplace injuries that result in death.
Under Idaho law, sections of Idaho's Workers' Compensation Act concerning declaration
of police power, exclusivity of an employer's liability, and exclusivity of employee's remedies,
as set forth in Idaho Code §§ 72-201, 72-209, and 72-211, are all a part of the worker's
compensation law and are to be interpreted in pari materia. Roe v. Albertson's Inc., 141 Idaho
524, 530, 112 P.3d 812, 818 (2005). Statutes in pari materia must be interpreted in light of each
other since they have a common purpose for comparable events or items. Additionally,
"worker's compensation statutes must be considered in the context of the entire act." See, e.g.,
Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 909, 980 P.2d 566, 573 (1999). "Pursuant to
LC. § 72-201 and § 72-707 1, it is clear that the legislature intended, in order for the worker's

Idaho Code§ 72-707, titled Commission has jurisdiction of disputes, provides in its entirety as
follows:
1

10

compensation law to achieve its purpose of providing sure and certain relief for injured workers
and their families, that all claims, issues and civil actions relating in any manner to the injury of a
worker, whether procedural or substantive, be decided under the worker's compensation act by
the [Idaho Industrial] Commission." Id.
In Roe, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the legislative intent of Idaho Code§§ 72-201
and 72-211 and the related significance of the subsequently adopted Idaho Code § 72-209
stating:
In looking at the intent behind LC. §§ 72-201 and 72-211 we have said, "the
legislature removed from the sphere of civil actions, all suits against an employer
for damages on account of personal injury or death of an employee, where such
injury or death rises out of and in the course of the employment.. .. " Gifford v.
Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 334, 193 P.2d 831, 833 (1948). In 1969, this Court
reaffirmed the holding in Gifford, recognizing that the "rule of law may in some
cases deprive persons of remedy for damages which they had prior to the passage
of the Workmen's Compensation Law .... " Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho
763,766,450 P.2d 610, 613 (1969).
Then in 1971, the legislature recodified the worker's compensation law. As stated
above both the police power section and the exclusive remedy section remained
part of the Act. Additionally, the legislature adopted a new provision, LC. § 72209, titled "Exclusiveness of liability of employer," which provides in part:
(1) Subject to the provisions of section 72-223, [Idaho Code] the
liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in
place of all other liability of the employer to the employee, his
spouse, dependents, heirs, legal representatives or assigns.
Prior to 1971 there was no similar provision, although this provision appears to be
All questions arising under this law, if not settled by agreement or stipulation of
the interested parties with the approval of the commission, except as otherwise
herein provided, shall be determined by the commission.
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the employer's mirror image of I.C. § 72-211. Both provisions state that if an
employer is liable under the worker's compensation law then all other liability is
excluded. Our prior caselaw interpreting the exclusiveness of worker's
compensation is unaffected by the enactment of I.C. § 72-209.
Roe, 141 Idaho at 529-30, 112 P.3d at 817-18 (emphasis added).
"Whenever an employee is injured or killed in the course of an employer-employee
relationship within the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Law, the injury or death
ordinarily gives rise to no cause of action in tort regardless of the fault of the employer."
Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 819, 555 P.2d 144, 150 (1976) (citing I.C. § 72-201). "The
employer's liability for the injury or death is under the Workmen's Compensation Law, I.C. §
72-209, and the remedy of the employee or his dependent or next of kin is under the Workmen's
Compensation Law, I.C. § 72-211." Id. (emphasis added).
In Stample, an Idaho Power employee was working with a mobile power line crew in the
course of his employment when he was electrocuted, which caused his immediate death.
Stample, 92 Idaho at 764, 450 P.2d at 611. After the accident, the deceased employee's parents
filed a claim with the "Industrial Accident Board2 as dependents seeking an award under the law
for death benefits arising from the accident in the course of their son's employment." Id. The
Accident Board determined "that since no claim was filed by any 'dependent,' as that term is
understood in the Workmen's Compensation Law, then $1,000.00 should be paid to the State of
Idaho, in accordance with I.C. s 72-301." Id. Unable to recover under the Worker's

2

The Industrial Accident Board is the Idaho Industrial Commission's predecessor.
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Compensation Law, the parents then brought a civil wrongful death suit pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 5-31 l3. Id. Idaho Power filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the district
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter. The district court granted the motion. The
Supreme Court discussed the district court's decision as follows:
Citing the case of Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 193 P.2d 831 (1948), the
court held that 'all rights and remedies for personal injuries or death as between
the employee and employer growing out of the employment relationship are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Board under the
Workmen's Compensation laws.' Gifford v. Nottingham, supra, and the statutes
amply demonstrate that the above holding is a correct statement of the law of
Idaho.
Id., 92 Idaho at 764,450 P.2d at 611. The Supreme Court's discussion included:

The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Laws, however, are quite explicit as to who
is to recover under them and the effect that their existence is to have on the
normal civil remedies. Parents may receive compensation only if dependent on
the child injured or killed, as is explicitly provided by LC. s 72-302.
Id., 92 Idaho at 765, 450 P.2d at 612. The Court went on to discuss the effect of worker's

compensation laws on other civil actions and stated that the declaration of police power statute4
within the act "notes that one of the main purposes of the statutory scheme was to remove these
cases from the courts." Id., 92 Idaho at 765, 450 P.2d at 612. "If that formal policy statement

Idaho Code § 5-311, Suit for wrongful death by or against heirs or personal representativesDamages, is Idaho's wrongful death statute.
3

When Stample was decided, the worker's compensation declaration of power statute was
codified in Idaho Code§ 72-102, which is now set forth in Idaho Code§ 72-201. Significantly,
Idaho Code § 72-102 as it existed at the time of the Stample decision did not include the word
"death" in describing causes "abolished" by Idaho's Worker's Compensation Laws.

4
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were not sufficient, LC. s 72-203 5 removes all remedies other than Workmen's Compensation, in
cases where workmen's compensation is applicable, from 'such employee, his personal
representatives, dependents, or next of kin."' Id.
Recent Idaho Supreme Court decisions that analyzed whether a civil suit was barred by
provisions of Idaho's Worker's Compensation Act involved cases where employees died during
the course and scope of their employment. See e.g., Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161 Idaho 211, 384
P.3d 975 (2016); Krinitt v. Idaho Dep't of Fish & Game, 162 Idaho 425, 398 P.3d 158 (2017)
(holding plaintiff's, who was the mother of deceased helicopter pilot, wrongful death action
against the Department of Fish and Game was barred as the Department had statutory employer
immunity from mother's claim pursuant to Worker's Compensation law). Additionally, both
Marek and Krinitt were decided at the district court level on the respective employer's motions

for summary judgment.
Here, in support of their arguments on appeal, Appellants focus on one word-deathand then attempt to interpret Idaho Code §§ 72-201, 209, and 211, in a vacuum, which is
inconsistent with Idaho case law. Moreover, Appellants cite to no authority in support of the
argument that the Idaho Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction over claims arising

This version of the statute was not included in the Act when it was recodified in 1971. Prior to
the recodification, LC. § 72-203 stated:

5

Right to compensation exclusive.-The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee on
account of a personal injury for which he is entitled to compensation under this act shall exclude
all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next
of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury ...
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from an employee's fatal injuries incurred during the course and scope of their employment.
When Idaho Code § 72-201 as well as Idaho Code § § 72-209 and 72-211 are analyzed in
the context of the entire Act, it is obvious the Idaho Legislature intended the Worker's
Compensation laws to include claims involving deaths. This supports the conclusion that the
Idaho Industrial Commission does have exclusive jurisdiction over Appellants' wrongful death
claim as it arises from the fatal injuries that Ms. Gomez sustained during the course and scope of
her employment with Crookham. The Act defines "death" as "death resulting from an injury or
occupational disease." LC. § 72-101(9). The Act includes a statutory mechanism for determining
who can recover worker's compensation income benefits for a work related death; the amount of
benefits to be paid; and time period for payment of benefits. The Act includes a specific statute
that defines "dependents" for purposes of determining who is entitled to income benefits upon
death of an employee. See LC. § 72-410; see also In re Haynes, 95 Idaho 492, 496, 511 P.2d
309, 313 (1973) (acknowledging that there is no hard and fast rule as to what constitutes
dependency under the Workmen's Compensation statute providing for compensation to
dependents upon death of employee pursuant to LC. § 72-410).
Additionally, Idaho Code § 72-413, Income benefits for death, provides that "[i]f death
results from the accident or occupational disease ... the employer shall pay to or for the benefit of
the following particular classes of dependents' weekly income benefits ... " I.C. § 72-413; see
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also I.C. 72-416, titled-Maximum and minimum income benefits for death 6• As noted above, as
a result of Ms. Gomez's death, her spouse and dependent son received worker's compensation
death benefits. (R. pp. 98 and 103.)
Appellants suggest "industrial death claims" have been given their own type of benefits
without direct citation to any authority for their proposition. Appellants do reference in a
footnote Idaho Code § 72-413 apparently to suggest this statute creates a different type of benefit
for death claims. A plain reading of the statute proves otherwise and Crookham believes it
provides additional support for the longstanding interpretation by the Idaho Supreme Court that
Idaho Code § 72-201 as well as Idaho Code §§ 72-209 and 72-211 include claims involving
workplace injuries causing death.
Idaho Code § 72-413 is entitled Income benefits for death and defines the particular
classes of dependents to whom "income benefits" should be paid by an employer. The "income
benefits" is a term defined by the Idaho Legislature in the body of the Worker's Compensation
law. Idaho Code § 72-102( 16) defines income benefits:
( 16) "Income benefits" means payments provided for or made under the
provisions of this law to the injured employee disabled by an injury or
occupational disease, or his dependents in case of death, excluding medical and
related benefits.
I.C. § 72-102(16). This establishes that the benefits payable to a dependent are no different than

Additional statutes within the Act relevant to the death of an employee are Idaho Code §§ 72411-Time of Dependency; 72-412-Periods of income benefits for death; 72-413A-Lump sum
payment upon remarriage; 72-415-Change in dependents.
6
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those paid to "the injured employee disabled by an injury ... " establishes that there is not a
different type of benefit associated with a work related death claim. And, significantly, that the
Idaho Legislature specifically included that dependents of workers killed on the job are to
receive income benefits is further evidence of the Legislative intent that claims involving death
be included within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Worker's Compensation Law and the
Industrial Commission's exclusive jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Idaho Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over Appellants'
wrongful death claim.

B.

The Idaho Industrial Commission Has Exclusive Jurisdiction over Claims for
Injuries, Including Fatal Injuries, Arising Out of and In the Course of
Employment.

Appellants' argument that the District Court "committed reversible error in determining
that the Exclusiveness of Employee Remedy Statute located at LC. § 72-211 provides exclusive
jurisdiction to the Idaho Industrial Commission in industrial death claims," is essentially the
same argument addressed in Section A above. (Appellants' Br., p. 25.) Appellants contend that
because the word death is not specifically included in Idaho Code § 72-211, the Legislature did
not intend for that statute to cover wrongful death claims. (Appellants' Br., p. 26.) This argument
is also incorrect. Additionally, Appellants fail to cite to any authority in support of this argument.
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., is dispositive of
Appellants' argument. 131 Idaho 258, 260, 954 P.2d 676, 678 (1998). In Meisner, plaintiff, who
was the adult child of a deceased worker, filed a complaint against her father's employer and coworker alleging negligence and wrongful death. Id., 131 Idaho at 260, 954 P.2d at 678. Before
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plaintiff filed suit, the employer's surety, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-420, deposited $10,000.00
in the State's Industrial Special Indemnity Account because none of the employee's heirs were
eligible to receive a death benefit under LC. § 72-413. Defendants moved for summary
judgment and also moved to dismiss pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6). Id. The district
court dismissed plaintiff's negligence and wrongful death claims on the basis of lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Id.
On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court erred when it dismissed her negligence
and wrongful death claims for lack of jurisdiction. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and
stated:
The district court based its decision on prior decisions of this Court that the
worker's compensation statutes provide the exclusive remedy for workers injured
on the job. See, Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 126 Idaho 688, 889 P.2d 717
(1994). Idaho Code sections 72-201 and 72-211 vest exclusive jurisdiction for
claims for injuries arising out of and sustained during the course of employment
in the Industrial Commission. Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 715 P.2d 978
( 1986). This includes claims brought by the survivors of workers killed on the
job. Stample v. Idaho Power Co., 92 Idaho 763, 450 P.2d 610 (1969). We
therefore find no error in the district court's dismissal of the negligence and
wrongful death claims on the basis of lack of jurisdiction.
Id. 131 Idaho at 260-61, 954 P.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added).

In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that Ms. Gomez died from the injuries
she incurred during the course and scope of her employment, the Idaho Industrial Commission
has exclusive jurisdiction over Appellants' claims. (R. p. 12.) Therefore, the District Court's
holding that Appellants' exclusive remedy is worker's compensation benefits should be affirmed.
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C.

Idaho Code § 72-209(1) Provides the Exclusive Remedy Rule.

Appellants contend that Idaho Code § 72-211 "is the Exclusive Remedy Rule in and of
itself." (Appellants' Br., p. 27.) Consistent with Appellants' previous arguments set forth above,
their contention that the exclusive remedy rule is Idaho Code § 72-211 in and of itself is
completely void of any supporting authority. (See generally Appellants' Br., pp. 27-37.) In fact,
less than a year and a half ago, this Court identified the exclusive remedy rule as follows:
The IWCA's exclusivity rule provides: "Subject to the provisions of section 72223, the liability of the employer under this law shall be exclusive and in place of
all other liability of the employer to the employee, his spouse, dependents, heirs,
legal representatives or assigns." J.C. § 72-209( 1).
Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co., 161 Idaho 205, 208, 384 P.3d 969, 972 (2016). The exception to the

exclusive remedy rule is set forth in Idaho Code § 72-209(3), which states: "where the injury or
death is proximately caused by the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer,
its officers, agents, servants or employees." J.C. § 72-209(3); see also Barrett, 161 Idaho at 208,
384 P.3d at 972.
Appellants further argue that Idaho Code § 72-209(3) does not provide the exception to
the exclusive remedy rule, "it actually creates an exception that can be utilized by a third party
[referring to third parties subject to J.C. § 72-223] to get paid back more than just the underlying
workers' compensation benefits in cases where it is determined that an employer is at fault to the
third party." (Appellants' Br., p. 34.) Appellants go on to claim that "[t]he express purpose of
Subsection (3) of [Idaho Code § 72-209] is to create an exception whereby a third party can
collect damages over and above the underlying worker's compensation benefits paid by the

19

employer." (Appellants' Br., p. 35.) However, this interpretation of Idaho Code §§ 72-209 and
72-223 is unsupported by legal authority, is incorrect, and should not be followed by this Court.
To reach their conclusion that the "express purpose" of Idaho Code § 72-209(3) is to
create an exception that allows third parties to collect damages against an employer in excess of
amounts paid in worker's compensation benefits, Appellants dissect and provide their own
interpretation, that is unsupported by legal authority interpreting Idaho Code §§ 72-209 and 72223, with particular focus on the "subject to the provisions of section 72-223 [Idaho Code] ... "
language found at Idaho Code § 72-209(1). In so doing, Appellants completely ignore the Idaho
Supreme Court's decision in Runcorn v. Shearer Lumber Prod., Inc., 107 Idaho 389, 690 P.2d
324 (1984), where the Court set forth the analysis that explains why the "subject to" language is
in Idaho Code §§ 72-209(1) and 72-211. Simply stated, the "subject to" language is in the
statutes because there can be a set of circumstances where a person or entity can be an
"employer" as defined by Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(a), but not subject to the limitations on
liability provided by Idaho's exclusive remedy rule. And, that circumstance is when there is a
business, who qualifies as an employer under Idaho Code § 72-102(13)(b), (Shearer Lumber
Products, Inc. ("Shearer") in Runcorn), and has contracted with another entity (Atlas Boiler &
Equipment Company ("Atlas") in Runcorn) who employs a worker who suffers a work injury
caused by the negligence of the contracted employer (Shearer), and is then subject to a lawsuit
brought under Idaho Code § 72-223 by the injured worker.
In Runcorn, plaintiff, a boiler repairman, whose employer, Atlas, contracted to repair a
boiler on the premises of Shearer in Elk City Idaho. Plaintiff was injured while he was repairing
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one of Shearer's boilers. Plaintiff received workmen's compensation benefits from Atlas's
surety. Plaintiff and his wife subsequently filed a third party action under LC. § 72-223 against
Shearer for its alleged negligence in causing the accident. The case was tried to a jury and a
special verdict was returned that apportioned the negligence of the parties as follows: 10% to
Runcorn; 60% to Shearer; and 30% to Atlas, who was not a party to the action. The jury awarded
plaintiff damages in the amount of $825,000, and $100,000 to plaintiff's wife for her loss of
consortium claim. The district court then reduced plaintiff's damages by the percentage of his
negligence, but refused to reduce the award by the amount of workmen's compensation benefits
that plaintiff already received. Shearer appealed.
The first issue addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court was whether Shearer was a
statutory employer to plaintiff and exempt from liability. Shearer argued that it was a statutory
employer and therefore immune from tort liability by the exclusive remedy rule set forth in Idaho
Code § 72-209(1). The Idaho Supreme Court determined Shearer did meet the definition of
"employer" contained in Idaho Code§ 72-102(10). "However, under the expanded definition of
"employer" in LC. § 72-102(10), which was 'designed to prevent an employer from avoiding
liability under the workmen's compensation statutes by subcontracting the work to others' who
may be irresponsible and not insure their employees, an employee may have more than one
employer." Id., 107 Idaho at 392-93, 690 P.2d at 327-28 (internal citation omitted).
The definition includes the direct employer/subcontractor, a contractor over the
subcontractor, and a qualifying proprietor or operator of a business over the
contractor. This does not mean that the qualifying proprietor or operator is the
statutory employer of the contractor and subcontractor; it does mean that the
qualifying proprietor or operator is the "employer" of the contractor's and
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subcontractor's employees, and the contractor is also an "employer" of the
subcontractor's employees. See I.C. § 72-216(1). In the present case, both Atlas
as the direct employer and Shearer as the "proprietor or operator of the business
there carried on," qualify as Runcorn's employers. I.C. § 72-102(10).

Id., 107 Idaho at 393, 690 P.2d at 328. Because both Atlas and Shearer qualified as plaintiff's
employers, the Court was then required to determine whether the status of a statutory employer
exempts all such employers from tort liability as third parties under Idaho Code § 72-223.
Shearer argued that employers within the definition of "employer," as defined in Idaho Code §
72-102( 10), are immune from tort liability as a third party. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed
and provided:
The exclusive liability of an employer under I.C. § 72-209(1), and the exclusive
remedies of an employee under I.C. § 72-211, are both specifically made "subject
to the provisions of section 72-223." I.C. § 72-223 provides that the workmen's
compensation law does not disturb the injured employee's right to sue a third
party for "legal liability to pay damages," and further that "[s]uch third party shall
include those employers described in section 72-216, having under them
contractors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the" statute
requiring procurement of workmen's compensation insurance.

Id., 107 Idaho at 393, 690 P.2d at 328 (italics in original). Shearer was also an employer, as
described in 72-216, because it had under it a contractor-Atlas-and Shearer was liable for
workmen's compensation benefits to plaintiff if Atlas had not provided coverage. However,
Atlas, the direct employer and contractor under Shearer, did provide workmen's compensation
coverage to plaintiff. Therefore, Shearer fell within the definition of a "third party" in Idaho
Code § 72-223, and could be held liable for damages, even though it also fell within the
definition of statutory "employer" under Idaho Code § 72-102(10). Id., 107 Idaho at 393, 690
P.2d at 328.
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The Runcorn Court's analysis of the statutory scheme of Idaho Code§§ 72-209 and 72223, establishes that under 72-209, some statutory employers can be sued and held liable for
damages as third parties. Meaning, the liability of an employer under Idaho Code § 72-209(1) is
not exclusive if the employer also qualifies as a third party under Idaho Code § 72-223.
The reference to Idaho Code§ 72-223 in Idaho Code§§ 72-209 and 72-211 provides for
an injured employee's right to sue a third party for "legal liability to pay damages," and also
provides that an employer can also be considered a third party, who can be held liable for
damages. Under those circumstances, the employer would not be immune from tort liability as
provided by the exclusive remedy rule set forth in Idaho Code § 72-209(1). The reference to
Idaho Code § 72-223 in both Idaho Code §§ 72-209 and 211, does not create the exception
Appellants argue for in their interpretation of Idaho Code § 72-209. Crookham respectfully
requests that this Court reject Appellants analysis and "motion."

D.

The Holdings in Corgatelli, Davis, and Wernecke are Distinguishable from the
Issues and Facts of this Case.

The holdings in Corgatelli v. Steel West, Inc., 157 Idaho 287, 335 P.3d 1150 (2014);

Davis v. Hammack Mgmt., Inc., 161 Idaho 791, 391 P.3d 1261 (2017), reh'g denied (Mar. 30,
2017), reh'g denied (Apr. 13, 2017); and Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Sch. Dist. No. 401, 147
Idaho 277, 207 P.3d 1008 (2009) are distinguishable from this case and should not be considered
on appeal. Appellants cite to these cases for the proposition that the Idaho Industrial Commission
"does not have exclusive jurisdiction over industrial death claims because [Idaho Code§ 72-201]
did not expressly give it that jurisdiction. The Industrial Commission does not have exclusive
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jurisdiction over remedies associated with industrial death claims because [Idaho Code § 72211], which provides for the exclusivity of employee remedies, was silent on death claims."
(Appellants' Br., pp. 37-38.)7
All of the cited cases are appeals from decisions of the Idaho Industrial Commission, not
decisions from Idaho district courts. None of the cases involve underlying circumstances of
workplace accidents giving rise to fatal injuries. Wernecke, for example, was an appeal from the
Commission's holding that an old settlement barred the appellant's future claims against the
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. Corgatelli principally focused on the issue of whether
previously paid benefits related to an impairment rating gave an employer a credit against
benefits it owed for an injured worker's total and permanent disability status. Davis followed
Corgatelli and, generally speaking, addressed the Commission's jurisdiction to address a petition

for declaratory ruling brought under a certain Commission rule of practice and procedure and
whether the Commission had authority to approve a stipulation that contained provisions found
to be in violation of Idaho Code § 72-318. In both Wernecke and Davis, the Court found the
orders issued by the Commission void because those orders violated Idaho Code § 72-318
because they approved agreements by an injured worker to waive rights to worker's
compensation benefits. Wernecke, 142 Idaho at 286-87; 207 P.3d at 1017-18; Davis, 161 Idaho at
Appellants also reference "Mayer" as a case upon which they rely for the proposition argued in
this section of their Appellants' Brief. A "Mayer" case is not cited in Appellants' discussion and
argument in this section. Respondent assumes Appellants' reference is to Mayer v. TPC
Holdings, 160 Idaho 223, 370 P.3d 738 (2016). For the same reasons discussed in Respondent's
arguments above, the "Mayer" decision has no application to the present appeal.

7
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796, 391 P.3d at 1266. It was the Commission's acts of entering orders that violated the
Worker's Compensation Act that resulted in the Court stating the Commission was outside of its
statutory authority in those cases. Wernecke, Davis, and Corgatelli in no way address issues of
the Commission's exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising from workplace accidents involving
fatal injuries such as the one before the Court in this appeal. As set forth above, the issues are
well settled. The exclusive remedy for workers injured on the job is in the worker's
compensation statutes; those statutes vest exclusive jurisdiction for claims for injuries arising out
of and sustained during the course of employment with the Commission; and this includes claims
brought by the survivors of those killed on the job. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,
261, 954 P.2d 676,679 (1998).

E.

The District Court Correctly Determined that Ms. Gomez Sustained Fatal
Injuries Caused by an Accident Arising Out of and In the Course of her
Employment.

Appellants' argument on appeal that "because Ms. Gomez suffered an industrial death,
her death does not meet the definition of accident [as defined by the Act] ... the Idaho Industrial
Commission does not have jurisdiction over her death claim and it can be pursued in the civil
court system" was not raised to the District Court below. (Appellants' Br., p. 39.) The issue
Appellants raised below was that the "Exclusive Remedy Rule does not apply because Ms.
Gomez's death did not occur in the scope of her employment." (R. p. 499.) Appellants claimed
that at the time of Ms. Gomez's death she was not working within the scope of her employment
because she was allegedly engaged in conduct that violated Crookham's Safety Manual. (R. pp.
499-500.) The District Court dismissed this argument as Appellants' own Complaint and
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Response to Crookham's Motion for Summary Judgment admitted that Ms. Gomez was in the
course and scope of her employment with Crookham when she incurred fatal injuries that caused
her death. (R. pp. 12 and 724.)
Because Appellants did not raise the issue of whether Ms. Gomez's death arose from an
accident as defined by the Act to the District Court, they are precluded from raising it for the first
time on appeal. See, e.g., KEB Enterprises, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690,
696 (2004) ("This Court's longstanding rule is that it will not consider issues raised for the first
time on appeal."). Therefore, this Court should not consider this issue on appeal.
Even if this issue is properly before the Court on appeal, it still fails as Appellants'
argument ignores the Act's definition of "death." As noted above, the Act defines "death" as
"death resulting from an injury or occupational disease." LC. § 72-102(9) (underline added).
"Injury" is also defined in the Act as a "personal injury caused by an accident arising out of and
in the course of any employment covered by the worker's compensation law." LC. § 72102(18)(a). "Accident" is defined as "an unexpected, undesigned, and unlooked for mishap, or
untoward event, connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which can be reasonably
located as to time when and place where it occurred, causing an injury." LC. § 72-102(18)(b ).
The Act then provides that '"Injury' and 'personal injury' shall be construed to include only an
injury caused by an accident, which results in violence to the physical structure of the body ... "
LC.§ 72-102(18)(c).
In this case, the undisputed evidence establishes that Ms. Gomez incurred fatal injuries
that resulted in her death while she was in the course and scope of her employment. It is also
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undisputed that Ms. Gomez's spouse and dependent son received worker's compensation death
benefits as a result of her death. Meaning, Ms. Gomez's fatal injuries and/or death are covered
by worker's compensation. In accordance with the holding in Anderson, because Ms. Gomez's
fatal injuries and/or death occurred in the course of her employment with Crookham, Appellants'
exclusive remedy is under Worker's Compensation Law.
Thus, the District Court's holding that Ms. Gomez sustained fatal injuries caused by an
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment with Crookham should be affirmed.

F.

The District Court Correctly Determined that Appellants Failed to Satisfy
Their Burden to Prove That the Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Rule
Applies.

"The Idaho Worker's Compensation Act is a compromise between injured workers and
their employers that provides a limit on liability for employers in return for providing sure and
certain relief for the injured worker." Marek, 161 Idaho at 215,384 P.3d at 979. Generally, Idaho
Worker's Compensation law provides the exclusive remedy for injuries arising out of and in the
course of employment. See e.g., I.C. §§ 72-201, 72-209 and 72-211; Barrett v. Hecla Mining

Co., 161 Idaho 205, 208, 384 P.3d 969, 972 (2016); see also Kearney v. Denker, 114 Idaho 755,
757,760 P.2d 1171, 1173 (1988); Dominguez ex rel. Hamp v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 142 Idaho 7,
11, 121 P.3d 938, 942 (2005).
In other words, "[f]or those injuries covered by worker's compensation, an employer is
generally liable to its employees only under the worker's compensation system and is immune
from other civil causes of action." Dominguez, 142 Idaho at 11, 121 P.3d at 942; see also

Anderson, 97 Idaho at 819, 555 P.2d at 150 ("[w]henever an employee is injured or killed in the
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course of an employer-employee relationship within the coverage of the Workmen's
Compensation Law, the injury or death ordinarily gives rise to no cause of action in tort
regardless of the fault of the employer, LC. § 72-201."). As noted above, Idaho Code§ 72-209(3)
provides an exception from the exclusive remedy rule "where the injury or death is proximately
caused by the willful or unprovoked physical aggression of the employer, its officers, agents,
servants or employees." LC § 72-209(3); Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co., 161 Idaho 205, 384 P.3d
969,972 (2016).
"An act of 'unprovoked physical aggression,' however, is one lacking in motive,
deliberation, or specific purpose." Marek, 161 Idaho at 217, 384 P.3d at 981. '"Unprovoked' is
defined as 'to rid of a motive, desire, or capability."' Id., at 980, quoting Webster's Third New
lnt'l Dictionary 2506 (1969). Unprovoked physical aggression occurs "where the employer (1)

committed an offensive action or hostile attack (2) aimed at the bodily integrity of the employee
with (3) an unprovoked, i.e., general, intent to injure an employee." Marek v. Hecla, Ltd., 161
Idaho 211, 217, 384 P .3d 97 5, 981 (2016). "To prove aggression there must be evidence of ( 1) an
offensive action or hostile attack and (2) intention to injure an employee." Id., 161 Idaho at 216,
384 P.3d at 980. "It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent acts
that made it substantially certain that injury would occur." See e.g., Kearney v. Denker, 114
Idaho 755,757, 760P.2d 1171, 1173 (1988).
The rule in Kearney was reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme Court in DeMoss v. City of
Coeur d'Alene, where the court held that an employer must engage in offensive, hostile act. 118

Idaho 176, 795 P.2d 875 (1990). In DeMoss, city employees sued the city and its supervisory
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employees contending that they directed the plaintiff-employees to remove insulation material
from a boiler. The plaintiffs alleged that the city and its supervisory employees were liable for
assault and battery (or unprovoked physical aggression under Idaho Code § 72-209(3)) and not
exempt from civil suit. In deciding the case, the Idaho Supreme Court cited Kearney v. Denker,
supra and Yeend v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 104 Idaho 333, 659 P.2d 87 (1983) and again

interpreted§ 72-209(3) to require proof of some evidence of some offensive action or hostile act.
The Court reiterated, "It is not sufficient to prove that the alleged aggressor committed negligent
acts that made it substantially certain that injury would occur." DeMoss, 118 Idaho at 178, 795
P.2d at 877 (quoting Kearney, 114 Idaho at 757, 760 P.2d at 1173).
"To support a finding that the employer acted with general intent, the employee does not
have to show the employer specifically wished the employee harm, but rather there must be
evidence that 'the employer actually knew or consciously disregarded knowledge that employee
injury would result from the employer's action."' Barrett v. Hecla Mining Co., 161 Idaho 205,
208, 384 P.3d 969, 972 (2016) (underline added and citation omitted).
In Marek, the Idaho Supreme Court held the following evidence was insufficient to
support a finding of unprovoked physical aggression:
(1) [Hecla] failed to secure engineer review and approval regarding the removal
of the pillar; (2) did not heed warnings from experienced employees about the
removal of the pillar; (3) failed to perform a safety review and follow safety
standards; and (4) was significantly sanctioned by MSHA, is sufficient to support
a finding that Hecla engaged in "willful or unprovoked physical conduct."
Marek, 161 Idaho at 218-19, 384 P.3d at 982-83. The Court further stated, "Heda's failure to

adhere to industry safety standards and its failure to heed warnings from experienced employees
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was negligent-even grossly so-but there is no evidence in the record that would support a
finding that Hecla had actual knowledge the stope would collapse." Id.; see also, DeMoss v. City
of Coeur D'Alene, 118 Idaho 176, 179, 795 P.2d 875, 878 (1990) (holding the exclusivity

exception did not apply where there was no evidence the employer specifically intended the
employees harm or that the employer knew the material was asbestos before instructing the
employees to remove the insulation).
In this case, Appellants rely upon the same evidence as they did below to support their
argument that they have satisfied their burden to establish the unprovoked physical aggression
exception to the exclusive remedy rule. 8 That evidence is: (1) the OSHA Report and citations; (2)
OSHA Form 300A; (3) Industrial Hygiene Report-which was struck from evidence by the
District Court; (4) totality of Dr. Aleksander's expert report; (4) alleged violations of the
Crookham Employee Manual, Safety Manual, and Seed Conditioning Manual; and (5) Affidavit
of Olga Olvera-portions of which were also struck by the District Court. (Appellants' Br., p.
43.) However, the District Court struck the Industrial Hygiene Report and portions of the Olvera
Affidavit, which Appellants attempted to use to establish Crookham's prior to Ms. Gomez's
death.
Similar to Marek and Barrett, there is no evidence that Crookham had actual knowledge
or consciously disregarded knowledge that an employee's hair would catch on the picking table's

8 In fact, Appellants merely copied the argument from their Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgement [sic] and pasted it in their appeal brief.
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drive shaft and pull the employee into the machine causing injury or death. In fact, after the
picking table was installed in the Scancore room, no incidents or near misses were reported that
involved the picking table. (R. pp. 550-551, Cardona Depo. pp. 77-78, 11. 15-1.)
Even if the evidence established that Crookham failed to adhere to its own and/or
industry safety standards and failed to heed warnings from experienced employees it would only
prove that Crookham was negligent. However, as the Idaho Supreme Court has held on multiple
occasions, a plaintiff does not satisfy their burden to establish the unprovoked physical
aggression exception by only proving that the employer committed negligent acts that made it
substantially certain that the injury would occur. See e.g., Kearney, Marek, Barrett, and DeMoss,
supra.

Additionally, Appellants' expert witness's report, which was created after the accident
occurred, does not prove the unprovoked physical aggression exception because (1) the report
was created after the accident occurred; (2) the report was not based on an inspection of the
picking table as it existed on the day of the accident; and (3) there is no evidence in the report
that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that an injury to an employee would occur by
not completely enclosing the drive shafts underneath the table. Appellants have not provided the
requisite evidence to prove Crookham committed an offensive hostile attack with the intention to
injure an employee.
This case is similar to Kearney, Marek, Barrett, and DeMoss, which were all decided in
favor of the employer on summary judgment, because there is no evidence that Crookham had
actual knowledge that cleaning the picking table would cause injury or death of an employee.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that Crookham ordered Ms. Gomez into an unsafe working
environment knowing that she would be injured or killed as a result. As such, Appellants have
not met their burden and established the unprovoked physical aggression exception to the
exclusive remedy rule.
Appellants' argument that the District Court failed to conduct an analysis of whether
Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that its conduct would result in harm to an
employee is incorrect. The District Court's analysis is set forth in its decision where it discusses
the unprovoked physical aggression exception in the context of Ms. Gomez's death. (R. pp. 725728.) The District Court relied upon the Idaho Supreme Court's decisions in both Barrett and
Marek where the Court analyzed the evidence that was presented to establish the unprovoked

physical aggression exception. The District Court, citing Marek, stated that there was "no
evidence in the record that Crookham had actual knowledge that the picking table would cause
the death of an employee." (R. p. 726.) Moreover, the District Court went on to discuss the
evidence at issue in Keamey and DeMoss, which again supported the District Court's conclusion
"that Crookham did not have actual knowledge that cleaning the picking table would cause the
injury or death of an employee." (R. pp. 726-728.) Based on the District Court's decision is
obvious that Crookham could not consciously disregard knowledge that it did not have. As such,
the District Court correctly determined that Appellants failed to satisfy their burden to prove that
the exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies.
Thus, the District Court's holding that Appellants failed to meet their burden to establish
the unprovoked physical aggression exception should be affirmed.
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G.

Under the Facts of this Case, Crookham is Not a Manufacturer as Defined by
the Idaho Product Liability Reform Act.

Appellants contend that Crookham is a manufacturer as defined by the Idaho Product
Liability Reform Act because the picking table is allegedly a component part of Crookham's
seed products. This argument is incorrect and misinterprets Idaho's products liability statutes.
In Sliman v. Aluminum Co. of Am., defendant-ALCOA was a manufacturer of a
component part-aluminum bottle caps. 112 Idaho 277, 278, 731 P.2d 1267, 1268 (1986).
ALCOA sold the aluminum bottle caps to a soft drink bottler who then used the caps to seal soda
bottles. The aluminum bottle caps that ALCOA sold to the bottler were component parts of the
soda bottles that were sold by the bottler and exploded from the bottle and injured plaintiff's eye.

See also, Int'! Harvester Co. v. TRW, Inc., 107 Idaho 1123, 695 P.2d 1262 (1985) (steering gear
mechanism sold to manufacturer of truck tractor for use in tractor was a component part of the
tractor).
Idaho Code§ 6-1402 defines "Manufacturer" and "Product seller" as follows:
(1) "Product seller" means any person or entity that is engaged in the business of
selling products, whether the sale is for resale, or for use or consumption. The
term includes a manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of the relevant
product. The term also includes a party who is in the business of leasing or bailing
such products. The term "product seller" does not include:
(a) A provider of professional services who utilizes or sells products
within the legally authorized scope of its professional practice. A
nonprofessional provider of services is not included unless the sale or use
of a product is the principal part of the transaction, and the essence of the
relationship between the seller and purchaser is not the furnishing of
judgment, skill, or services;
(b) A commercial seller of used products who resells a product after use
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by a consumer or other product user, provided the used product is in
essentially the same condition as when it was acquired for resale; and
(c) A finance lessor who is not otherwise a product seller. A "finance
lessor" is one who acts in a financial capacity, who is not a manufacturer,
wholesaler, distributor, or retailer, and who leases a product without
having a reasonable opportunity to inspect and discover defects in the
product, under a lease arrangement in which the selection, possession,
maintenance, and operation of the product are controlled by a person other
than the lessor.
(2) "Manufacturer" includes a product seller who designs, produces, makes,
fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the relevant product or component part
of a product before its sale to a user or consumer. It includes a product seller or
entity not otherwise a manufacturer that holds itself out as a manufacturer. A
product seller acting primarily as a wholesaler, distributor, or retailer of a product
may be a "manufacturer" but only to the extent that it designs, produces, makes,
fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures the product before its sale.
LC.§ 6-1402 (underline added).
In this case, Crookham is neither a "Manufacturer," nor a "Product seller" as defined by
statute because it does not sell, market, or advertise the picking table. (R. p. 87.) Crookham does
not hold itself out as a manufacturer of the picking table. (Id., at p. 88.) Additionally, the picking
table has never left Crookham's control and/or facility, and Crookham did not place the table
into the stream of commerce. (Id.) As such, the picking table is not a "product" as defined by
Idaho Code§ 6-1402(3).
Therefore, the District Court's dismissal of Appellants' products liability claims should
be affirmed.
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H.

Appellants' Request for an Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs on Appeal
And Request to Overturn the District Court's Award of Costs to Crookham
Should Be Denied.

Appellants appear to request an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal (Appellants'
Br., p. 22, Section IV), but merely cite to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121, Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure 54(d) and 54(e), Idaho Appellate Rule 41, and all other applicable state law. (Id.)
However, other than Appellants' citation to these statutes and rules authorizing fees, they fail to
provide any argument, let alone cite to any case authority, as to why they should be awarded
attorney's fees and costs on appeal.
Under Idaho law, a mere citation to statutes and rules authorizing fees, without more, is
insufficient to entitle a party to an award of appellate attorney fees. See, e.g., Capps v. FIA Card
Servs., N.A., 149 Idaho 737, 745, 240 P.3d 583, 591 (2010) (declining to award attorney fees on

appeal where requesting party only cited to statutes and rules allowing a court to award
reasonable attorney fees but failed to provide any argument as to why fees should be awarded).
Appellants also identify that one of the issues on appeal is "[ w]hether the Court erred in
awarding Respondent's costs." (Appellants' Br., p. 22.) However, the analysis section of
Appellants' Brief fails to include any argument, explanation, or authority on this issue.
Therefore, this Court should affirm the District Court's award of costs as a matter of right to
Crookham.
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V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Crookham respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District
Court's decision on Crookham's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismiss Appellants'
Complaint in its entirety with prejudice.
DATED this ~ a y of April, 2018.
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